Paulus libro secundo ad edictum
Compromissum ad similitudinem iudiciorum redigitur et ad finiendas lites pertinet.
Ulpianus libro quarto ad edictum
Ex compromisso placet exceptionem non nasci, sed poenae petitionem.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Labeo ait, si compromisso facto sententia dicta est, quo quis a minore viginti quinque annis tutelae absolveretur, ratum id a praetore non habendum: neque poenae eo nomine commissae petitio dabitur.
1. Tametsi neminem praetor cogat arbitrium recipere, quoniam haec res libera et soluta est et extra necessitatem iurisdictionis posita, attamen ubi semel quis in se receperit arbitrium, ad curam et sollicitudinem suam hanc rem pertinere praetor putat: non tantum quod studeret lites finiri, verum quoniam non deberent decipi, qui eum quasi virum bonum disceptatorem inter se elegerunt. Finge enim post causam iam semel atque iterum tractatam, post nudata utriusque intima et secreta negotii aperta, arbitrum vel gratiae dantem vel sordibus corruptum vel alia qua ex causa nolle sententiam dicere: quisquamne potest negare aequissimum fore praetorem interponere se debuisse, ut officium quod in se recepit impleret?
2. Ait praetor: "Qui arbitrium pecunia compromissa receperit".
3. Tractemus de personis arbitrantium. Et quidem arbitrum cuiuscumque dignitatis coget officio quod susceperit perfungi, etiam si sit consularis: nisi forte sit in aliquo magistratu positus vel potestate, consul forte vel praetor, quoniam in hoc imperium non habet.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Nam magistratus superiore aut pari imperio nullo modo possunt cogi: nec interest ante an in ipso magistratu arbitrium susceperint. Inferiores possunt cogi.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
Sed et filius familias compelletur.
Gaius libro quinto ad edictum provinciale
Quin etiam de re patris dicitur, filium familias arbitrum esse posse: nam et iudicem eum esse posse plerisque placet.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Pedius libro nono et Pomponius libro trigensimo tertio scribunt parvi referre, ingenuus quis an libertinus sit, integrae famae quis sit arbiter an ignominiosus. In servum Labeo compromitti non posse libro undecimo scribit: et est verum.
1. Unde Iulianus ait, si in Titium et servum compromissum sit, nec Titium cogendum sententiam dicere, quia cum alio receperit: quamvis servi, inquit, arbiterium nullum sit. Quid tamen si dixerit sententiam Titius? Poena non committitur, quia non, ut receperit, dixit sententiam.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Sed si ita compromissum sit, ut vel alterutrius sententia valeat, titium cogendum.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Sed si in servum compromittatur et liber sententiam dixerit, puto, si liber factus fecerit consentientibus partibus, valere.
1. Sed neque in pupillum neque in furiosum aut surdum aut mutum compromittetur, ut Pomponius libro trigensimo tertio scribit.
2. Si quis iudex sit, arbitrium recipere eius rei, de qua iudex est, inve se compromitti iubere prohibetur lege Iulia: et si sententiam dixerit non est danda poenae persecutio.
3. Sunt et alii, qui non coguntur sententiam dicere, ut puta si sordes aut turpitudo arbitri manifesta sit.
4. Iulianus ait, si eum infamaverunt litigatores, non omnimodo praetorem debere eum excusare, sed causa cognita.
5. Idem et si spreta auctoritate eius ad iudicium.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Vel alium arbitrum.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Litigatores ierint, mox ad eundem arbitrum redierint, praetorem non debere eum cogere inter eos disceptare, qui ei contumeliam hanc fecerunt, ut eum spernerent et ad alium irent.
1. Arbitrum autem cogendum non esse sententiam dicere, nisi compromissum intervenerit.
2. Quod ait praetor: "Pecuniam compromissam", accipere nos debere, non si utrimque poena nummaria, sed si et alia res vice poenae, si quis arbitri sententia non steterit, promissa sit: et ita Pomponius scribit. Quid ergo, si res apud arbitrum depositae sunt eo pacto, ut ei daret qui vicerit, vel ut eam rem daret, si non pareatur sententiae, an cogendus sit sententiam dicere? Et puto cogendum. Tantundem et si quantitas certa ad hoc apud eum deponatur. Proinde et si alter rem, alter pecuniam stipulanti promiserit, plenum compromissum est et cogetur sententiam dicere.
3. Interdum, ut Pomponius scribit, recte nudo pacto fiet compromissum, ut puta si ambo debitores fuerunt et pacti sunt, ne petat quod sibi debetur qui sententiae arbitri non paruit.
4. Item Iulianus scribit non cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, si alter promiserit, alter non. Idem dicit, et si sub condicione fuerit poena compromissa, veluti "si navis ex Asia venerit, tot milia": non enim prius arbitrum cogendum sententiam dicere, quam condicio exstiterit: ne sit inefficax deficiente condicione. Et ita Pomponius libro trigensimo tertio ad edictum scribit.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Quo casu ad praetorem pertinebit in eo forsitan solo, ut si possit dies compromissi proferri, proferatur.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Pomponius ait, et si alteri accepto lata sit poena compromissi, non debere eum compelli sententiam dicere.
1. Idem Pomponius scribit, si de meis solis controversiis sit compromissum et de te poenam sim stipulatus, videndum ne non sit compromissum. Sed cui rei moveatur, non video: nam si ideo, quia de unius controversiis solum compromissum est, nulla ratio est: licet enim et de una re compromittere: si vero ideo, quia ex altera dumtaxat parte stipulatio intervenit, est ratio. Quamquam si petitor fuit qui stipulatus est, possit dici plenum esse compromissum, quia is qui convenitur tutus est veluti pacti exceptione, is qui convenit, si arbitro non pareatur, habet stipulationem. Sed id verum esse non puto: neque enim sufficit exceptionem habere, ut arbiter sententiam dicere cogatur.
2. Recepisse autem arbitrium videtur, ut Pedius libro nono dicit, qui iudicis partes suscepit finemque se sua sententia controversiis impositurum pollicetur. Quod si, inquit, hactenus intervenit, ut experiretur, an consilio suo vel auctoritate discuti litem paterentur, non videtur arbitrium recepisse.
3. Arbiter ex compromisso his diebus non cogitur sententiam dicere, quibus iudex non cogetur, nisi dies compromissi exitura sit nec proferri possit.
4. Proinde si forte urgueatur a praetore ad sententiam, aequissimum erit, si iuret sibi de causa nondum liquere, spatium ei ad pronuntiandum dari.
Pomponius libro 11 ad Quintum Mucium
Sed si compromissum sine die confectum est, necesse est arbitro omnimodo dies statuere, partibus scilicet consentientibus, et ita causam disceptari: quod si hoc praetermiserit, omni tempore cogendus est sententiam dicere.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
Licet autem praetor destricte edicat sententiam se arbitrum dicere coacturum, attamen interdum rationem eius habere debet et excusationem recipere causa cognita: ut puta si fuerit infamatus a litigatoribus, aut si inimicitiae capitales inter eum et litigatores aut alterum ex litigatoribus intercesserint, aut si aetas aut valetudo quae postea contigit id ei munus remittat, aut occupatio negotiorum propriorum vel profectio urguens aut munus aliquod rei publicae: et ita Labeo:
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Et si qua alia incommoditas ei post arbiterium susceptum incidat. Sed in causa valetudinis similibusve causa cognita differre cogitur.
1. Arbiter iudicii sui nomine, quod publicum aut privatum habet, excusatus esse debet a compromisso, utique si dies compromissi proferri non potest: quod si potest, quare non cogat eum, cum potest, proferre? Quod sine ulla distinctione ipsius interdum futurum est. Si tamen uterque velit eum sententiam dicere, an, quamvis cautum non sit de die proferenda, non alias impetret, quia iudicium habet, ne cogatur, quam si consentiat denuo in se compromitti? Haec scilicet si dies exitura est.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Item si unus ex litigatoribus bonis suis cedat, Iulianus libro quarto digestorum scribit non esse cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, cum neque agere neque conveniri possit.
1. Si multo post revertantur ad arbitrum litigatores, non esse cogendum sententiam dicere Labeo scribit.
2. Item si plures sunt qui arbitrium receperunt, nemo unus cogendus erit sententiam dicere, sed aut omnes aut nullus.
3. Inde Pomponius libro trigensimo tertio quaerit, si ita sit compromissum, ut quod Titio disceptatori placet, id Seius pronuntiet, quis sit cogendus? Et puto tale arbitrium non valere, in quo libera facultas arbitri sententiae non est futura.
4. Sed si ita sit compromissum arbitratu titii aut seii fieri, Pomponius scribit et nos putamus compromissum valere: sed is erit cogendus sententiam dicere, in quem litigatores consenserint.
5. Si in duos fuerit sic compromissum, ut si dissentirent, tertium adsumant, puto tale compromissum non valere: nam in adsumendo possunt dissentire. Sed si ita sit, ut eis tertius adsumeretur Sempronius, valet compromissum, quoniam in adsumendo dissentire non possunt.
6. Principaliter tamen quaeramus, si in duos arbitros sit compromissum, an cogere eos praetor debeat sententiam dicere, quia res fere sine exitu futura est propter naturalem hominum ad dissentiendum facilitatem. In inpari enim numero idcirco compromissum admittitur, non quoniam consentire omnes facile est, sed quia et si dissentiant, invenitur pars maior, cuius arbitrio stabitur. Sed usitatum est etiam in duos compromitti, et debet praetor cogere arbitros, si non consentiant, tertiam certam eligere personam, cuius auctoritati pareatur.
7. Celsus libro secundo digestorum scribit, si in tres fuerit compromissum, sufficere quidem duorum consensum, sed si praesens fuerit et tertius: alioquin absente eo licet duo consentiant, arbitrium non valere, quia in plures fuit compromissum et potuit praesentia eius trahere eos in eius sententiam:
Pomponius libro 17 epistularum et variis lectionibus
Sicuti tribus iudicibus datis quod duo ex consensu absente tertio iudicaverunt, nihil valet, quia id "tum" demum, quod maior pars omnium iudicavit, ratum est, cum et omnes iudicasse palam est.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Qualem autem sententiam dicat arbiter, ad praetorem non pertinere Labeo ait, dummodo dicat quod ipsi videtur. Et ideo si sic fuit in arbitrium compromissum, ut certam sententiam dicat, nullum esse arbitrium, nec cogendum sententiam dicere Iulianus scribit libro quarto digestorum.
1. Dicere autem sententiam existimamus eum, qui ea mente quid pronuntiat, ut secundum id discedere eos a tota controversia velit, sed si de pluribus rebus sit arbiterium receptum, nisi omnes controversias finierit, non videtur dicta sententia, sed adhuc erit a praetore cogendus.
2. Unde videndum erit, an mutare sententiam possit. Et alias quidem est agitatum, si arbiter iussit dari, mox vetuit, utrum eo quod iussit an eo quod vetuit stari debeat. Et Sabinus quidem putavit posse. Cassius sententiam magistri sui bene excusat et ait Sabinum non de ea sensisse sententia, quae arbitrium finiat, sed de praeparatione causae: ut puta si iussit litigatores calendis adesse, mox idibus iubeat: nam mutare eum diem posse. Ceterum si condemnavit vel absolvit, dum arbiter esse desierit, mutare sententiam non posse,
Gaius libro quinto ad edictum
provinciale Quia arbiter, etsi erraverit in sententia dicenda, corrigere eam non potest.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Quid tamen si de pluribus controversiis sumptus est nihil sibi communibus et de una sententiam dixit, de aliis nondum, numquid desiit esse arbiter? Videamus igitur, an in prima controversia possit mutare sententiam, de qua iam dixerat. Et multum interest, de omnibus simul ut dicat sententiam compromissum est, an non: nam si de omnibus, poterit mutare (nondum enim dixit sententiam): quod si et separatim, quasi plura sunt compromissa, et ideo quantum ad illam controversiam pertinet, arbiter esse desierat.
1. Si arbiter ita pronuntiasset nihil videri titium debere seio: tametsi seium non vetuisset petere, tamen si quid petisset, videri contra sententiam arbitri fecisse: et id Ofilius et Trebatius responderunt.
2. Solutioni diem posse arbitrum statuere puto: et ita et Trebatius videtur sentire.
3. Pomponius ait inutiliter arbitrum incertam sententiam dicere, ut puta: "quantum ei debes redde " : "divisioni vestrae stari placet": "pro ea parte, quam creditoribus tuis solvisti, accipe".
4. Item si arbiter poenam ex compromisso peti vetuerit, in libro trigensimo tertio apud Pomponium scriptum habeo non valere: et habet rationem, quia non de poena compromissum est.
5. Papinianus libro tertio quaestionum ait, si cum dies compromissi finiretur, prolato die litigatores denuo in eum compromiserint nec secundi compromissi arbitrium receperit, non esse cogendum recipere, si ipse in mora non fuit, quo minus partibus suis fungeretur: quod si per eum factum est, aequissimum esse cogi eum a praetore sequens recipere. Quae quaestio ita procedit, si nihil in priore compromisso de die proferendo caveatur: ceterum si cavebatur et ipse protulit, mansit arbiter.
6. Plenum compromissum appellatur, quod "de rebus controversiisve" compositum est: nam ad omnes controversias pertinet. Sed si forte de una re sit disputatio, licet pleno compromisso actum sit, tamen ex ceteris causis actiones superesse: id enim venit in compromissum, de quo actum est ut veniret. Sed est tutius, si quis de certa re compromissum facturus sit, de ea sola exprimere in compromisso.
7. Non debent autem obtemperare litigatores, si arbiter aliquid non honestum iusserit.
8. Si intra diem compromissi aditus arbiter post diem compromissi adesse iusserit, poena non committetur.
9. Si quis ex litigatoribus ideo non adfuerit, quod valetudine vel rei publicae causa absentia impeditus sit aut magistratu aut alia iusta de causa, poenam committi Proculus et Atilicinus aiunt: sed si paratus sit in eundem compromittere, actionem denegari aut exceptione tutum fore. Sed hoc ita demum verum erit, si arbiter recipere in se arbiterium fuerit paratus: nam invitum non esse cogendum Iulianus libro quarto digestorum recte scribit: ipse autem nihilo minus poena absolvitur.
10. Si arbiter iussit puta in provincia adesse litigatores, cum Romae esset in eum compromissum, an ei impune non pareatur, quaeritur. Et est verius, quod Iulianus ait libro quarto, eum locum compromisso inesse, de quo actum sit ut promitteretur: impune igitur ei non parebitur, si alio loci adesse iusserit. Quid ergo, si non appareat, de quo loco actum sit? Melius dicetur eum locum contineri, ubi compromissum est. Quid tamen si in eo loco, qui sit circa urbem, adesse iusserit? Pegasus admittit valere iussum. Quod puto ita verum esse, si et eius sit auctoritatis arbiter, ut in secessibus soleat agere, et litigatores facile eo loci venire possint.
11. Sed si in aliquem locum inhonestum adesse iusserit, puta in popinam vel in lupanarium, ut Vivianus ait, sine dubio impune ei non parebitur: quam sententiam et Celsus libro secundo digestorum probat. Unde eleganter tractat, si is sit locus, in quem alter ex litigatoribus honeste venire non possit, alter possit, et is non venerit, qui sine sua turpitudine eo venire possit, is venerit, qui inhoneste venerat, an committatur poena compromissi an quasi opera non praebita. Et recte putat non committi: absurdum enim esse iussum in alterius persona ratum esse, in alterius non.
12. Intra quantum autem temporis, nisi detur quod arbiter iusserit, committatur stipulatio, videndum est. Et si quidem dies adiectus non sit, Celsus scribit libro secundo digestorum inesse quoddam modicum tempus: quod ubi praeterierit, poena statim peti potest: et tamen, inquit, et si dederit ante acceptum iudicium, agi ex stipulatu non poterit:
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Utique nisi eius interfuerit tunc solvi.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Celsus ait, si arbiter intra kalendas septembres dari iusserit nec datum erit, licet postea offeratur, attamen semel commissam poenam compromissi non evanescere, quoniam semper verum est intra kalendas datum non esse: sin autem oblatum accepit, poenam petere non potest doli exceptione removendus. contra, ubi dumtaxat dare iussus est.
1. Idem ait, si iusserit me tibi dare et valetudine sis impeditus, quo minus accipias, aut alia iusta ex causa, Proculum existimare poenam non committi, nec si post kalendas te parato accipere non dem. Sed ipse recte putat duo esse arbitri praecepta, unum pecuniam dari, aliud intra kalendas dari: licet igitur in poenam non committas, quod intra calendas non dederis, quoniam per te non stetit, tamen committis in eam partem, quod non das.
2. Idem ait nihil aliud esse sententiae stare posse, quam id agere, quantum in ipso sit, ut arbitri pareatur sententiae.
3. Idem celsus ait, si arbiter me tibi certa die pecuniam dare iusserit, tu accipere noluisti, posse defendi ipso iure poenam non committi.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Sed si postea ille paratus sit accipere, non impune me non daturum: non enim ante feceram.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Labeo ait, si arbiter, cum in compromisso cautum esset, ut eadem die de omnibus sententiam diceret et ut posset diem proferre, de quibusdam rebus dicta sententia, de quibusdam non dicta diem protulit: valere prolationem sententiaeque eius posse impune non pareri. Et Pomponius probat Labeonis sententiam, quod et mihi videtur: quia officio in sententia functus non est.
1. Haec autem clausula "diem compromissi proferre" nullam aliam dat arbitro facultatem quam diem prorogandi: et ideo condicionem primi compromissi neque minuere neque immutare potest: et ideo cetera quoque discutere et pro omnibus unam sententiam ferre debebit.
2. Si per fideiussorem fuerit cautum in primo compromisso, et sequens similiter proferendum Labeo dicit. Sed Pomponius dubitat, utrum isdem an et aliis tam idoneis: quid enim, inquit, si idem fideiubere noluerint? Sed puto, si noluerint fideiubere, tunc alios non absimiles adhibendos,
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Ne in potestate sit fideiussorum postea se non obligantium, ut poena committatur. Idemque et si decesserint.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Diem proferre vel praesens vel per nuntium vel per epistulam potest.
1. Si heredis mentio vel ceterorum facta in compromisso non fuerit, morte solvetur compromissum: nec utimur Labeonis sententia, qui existimavit, si arbiter aliquem pecuniam dare iusserit et is decesserit antequam daret, poenam committi, licet heres eius paratus sit offerre.
2. Stari autem debet sententiae arbitri, quam de ea re dixerit, sive aequa sive iniqua sit: et sibi imputet qui compromisit. Nam et divi Pii rescripto adicitur: "Vel minus probabilem sententiam aequo animo ferre debet".
3. Si plures arbitri fuerint et diversas sententias dixerint, licebit sententia eorum non stari: sed si maior pars consentiat, ea stabitur, alioquin poena committetur. Inde quaeritur apud Iulianum, si ex tribus arbitris unus quindecim, alius decem, tertius quinque condemnent, qua sententia stetur: et Iulianus scribit quinque debere praestari, quia in hanc summam omnes consenserunt.
4. Si quis litigatorum defuerit, quia per eum factum est, quo minus arbitretur, poena committetur. Proinde sententia quidem dicta non coram litigatoribus non valebit, nisi in compromissis hoc specialiter expressum sit, ut vel uno vel utroque absente sententia promatur: poenam autem is qui defuit committit, quia per eum factum est quo minus arbitretur.
5. Coram autem dicere sententiam videtur, qui sapientibus dicit: ceterum coram furioso vel demente non videtur dici: item coram pupillo non videri sententiam dictam, nisi tutor praesens fuit: et ita de his omnibus Iulianus libro quarto digestorum scribit.
6. Et si quis praesens arbitrum sententiam dicere prohibuit, poena committetur.
7. Sed si poena non fuisset adiecta compromisso, sed simpliciter sententia stari quis promiserit, incerti adversus eum foret actio.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Non autem interest, certa an incerta summa compromissa sit, ut puta " quanti ea res erit".
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
Adversus sententiam arbitri fit, si petatur ab eo a quo arbiter peti vetuit. Quid ergo si a fideiussore eius petatur, an poena committatur? Et puto committi, et ita Sabinus scribit: nam ty dunamei a reo petit. Sed si cum fideiussore compromisi et a reo petatur, nisi intersit fideiussoris, non committetur.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
Si quis rem, de qua compromissum sit, in iudicium deducat, quidam dicunt praetorem non intervenire ad cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, quia iam poena non potest esse, atque si solutum est compromissum. Sed si hoc optinuerit, futurum est, ut in potestate eius, quem paenitet compromisisse, sit compromissum eludere. Ergo adversus eum poena committenda est lite apud iudicem suo ordine peragenda.
Ulpianus libro 13 ad edictum
Ita demum autem committetur stipulatio, cum adversus eam quid fit, si sine dolo malo stipulantis factum est: sub hac enim condicione committitur stipulatio, ne quis doli sui praemium ferat. Sed si quidem compromisso adiciatur "ut si quid dolo in ea re factum sit", ex stipulatu conveniri qui dolo fecit potest: et ideo si arbitrum quis corrupit vel pecunia vel ambitione, vel advocatum diversae partis, vel aliquem ex his, quibus causam suam commiserat, ex doli clausula poterit conveniri, vel si adversarium callide circumvenit, et omnino si in hac lite dolose versatus est, locum habebit ex stipulatu actio: et ideo si velit de dolo actionem exercere adversarius, non debebit, cum habeat ex stipulatu actionem. quod si huiusmodi clausula in compromisso adscripta non est, tunc de dolo actio vel exceptio locum habebit. Hoc autem compromissum plenum est, quod et doli clausulae habet mentionem.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Non distinguemus in compromissis, minor an maior sit poena quam res de qua agitur.
1. Non cogetur arbiter sententiam dicere, si poena commissa sit.
2. Si mulier alieno nomine compromittat, non erit pecunia compromissa propter intercessionem.
3. Summa rei est, ut praetor se non interponat, sive initio nullum sit compromissum: sive sit, sed pendeat, an ex eo poena exigi potest: sive postea deficiat poena compromisso soluto die morte acceptilatione iudicio pacto.
4. Sacerdotio obveniente videbimus an cogatur arbiter sententiam dicere: id enim non tantum honori personarum, sed et maiestati dei indulgetur, cuius sacris vacare sacerdotes oportet. Ceterum si postea suscepit, iste quoque omnimodo sententiam ferre debet.
5. Item non est cogendus, si de negotio transactum est, vel homo mortuus est de quo erat compromissum: nisi si posteriore casu aliquid litigantium intersit.
6. Iulianus indistincte scribit: si per errorem de famoso delicto ad arbitrum itum est, vel de ea re, de qua publicum iudicium sit constitutum, veluti de adulteriis sicariis et similibus, vetare debet praetor sententiam dicere nec dare dictae exsecutionem.
7. De liberali causa compromisso facto recte non compelletur arbiter sententiam dicere, quia favor libertatis est, ut maiores iudices habere debeat. Eadem dicenda sunt, sive de ingenuitate sive de libertinitate quaestio sit et si ex fideicommissi causa libertas deberi dicatur. Idem dicendum est in populari actione.
8. Si servus compromiserit, non cogendum dicere sententiam arbitrum, nec si dixerit, poenae exsecutionem dandam de peculio putat octavenus. Sed an, si liber cum eo compromiserit, exsecutio adversus liberum detur, videamus: sed magis est, ut non detur.
9. Item si quis Romae compromiserit, mox Romam in legationem venerit: non est cogendus arbiter sententiam dicere, non magis quam cogeretur, si litem ante contestatus esset, nunc eam exercere: nec interest, tunc quoque in legatione fuerit an non. Sed si nunc in legatione compromittat, puto cogendum arbitrum sententiam dicere, quia et si iudicium sponte accepisset, cogeretur peragere. Sunt tamen qui de isto non recte dubitant: qui utique nullo modo dubitabunt, si de ea re in legatione compromisit, quam in legatione contraxit: quia et iudicium eo nomine accipere cogeretur. Illud in prima specie potest dispici, an, si ante compromisit legatus, cogendus sit arbiter sententiam dicere, si ipse legatus postulet: quod prima ratione poterit videri iniquum, ut in ipsius potestate sit. Sed hoc tale erit, quale si actionem velit dictare, quod facere ei licet. Sed compromissum istud comparabimus ordinariae actioni, ut non alias audiatur desiderans, ut arbiter sententiam dicat, quam si se defendat.
10. Si is faciat controversiam hereditatis, qui cum defuncto compromiserat, futurum est praeiudicium hereditati, si arbiter sententiam dicat: ergo interea inhibendus est arbiter.
11. Dies compromissi proferri potest, non cum ex conventione, sed cum iussu arbitri eam proferri necesse est, ne poena committatur.
12. Si arbiter sese celare temperaverit, praetor eum investigare debet, et si diu non paruerit, multa adversus eum dicenda est.
13. Cum in plures compromissum est ea condicione, ut quilibet vel unus dixisset sententiam, eo staretur, absentibus ceteris nihilo minus qui praesens est cogetur: at si ea condicione, ut omnes dicant, vel quod de maioris partis sententia placuerit, non debet singulos separatim cogere, quia singulorum sententia ad poenam non facit.
14. Cum quidam arbiter ex aliis causis inimicus manifeste apparuisset, testationibus etiam conventus, ne sententiam diceret, nihilo minus nullo cogente dicere perseverasset, libello cuiusdam id querentis imperator Antoninus subscripsit posse eum uti doli mali exceptione. Et idem, cum a iudice consuleretur, apud quem poena petebatur, rescripsit, etiamsi appellari non potest, doli mali exceptionem in poenae petitione obstaturam. Per hanc ergo exceptionem quaedam appellandi species est, cum liceat retractare de sententia arbitri.
15. De officio arbitri tractantibus sciendum est omnem tractatum ex ipso compromisso sumendum: nec enim aliud illi licebit, quam quod ibi ut efficere possit cautum est: non ergo quod libet statuere arbiter poterit nec in qua re libet nisi de qua re compromissum est et quatenus compromissum est.
16. Quaesitum est de sententia dicenda, et dictum non quamlibet, licet de quibusdam variatum sit. Et puto vere non committi, si dicat ad iudicem de hoc eundum vel in se vel in alium compromittendum. Nam et Iulianus impune non pareri, si iubeat ad alium arbitrum ire, ne finis non sit: quod si hoc modo dixerit, ut arbitrio publii maevii fundus traderetur aut satisdatio detur, parendum esse sententiae. Idem pedius probat: ne propagentur arbitria, aut in alios interdum inimicos agentium transferantur, sua sententia finem controversiae eum imponere oportet: non autem finiri controversiam, cum aut differatur arbitrium aut in alium transferatur: partemque sententiae esse, quemadmodum satisdetur, quibus fideiussoribus, idque delegari non posse, nisi ad hoc compromissum sit, ut arbiter statueret, cuius arbitratu satisdaretur.
17. Item si iubeat sibi alium coniungi, cum id in compromisso non sit, non dicit sententiam: nam sententia esse debet de re compromissa, de hoc autem compromissum non est.
18. Si domini, qui invicem stipulati sint, procuratores suos agere apud arbitrum velint, potest iubere ipsos etiam adesse:
19. Sed si et heredis in compromissis mentio fit, potest iubere etiam heredem eorum adesse.
20. Arbitri officio continetur et quemadmodum detur vacua possessio. an et satis ratam rem habiturum? Sextus Pedius putat, quod nullam rationem habet: nam si ratum non habeat dominus, committetur stipulatio.
21. Arbiter nihil extra compromissum facere potest et ideo necessarium est adici de die compromissi proferenda: ceterum impune iubenti non parebitur.
Papinianus libro primo quaestionum
Arbiter ita sumptus ex compromisso, ut et diem proferre possit, hoc quidem facere potest: referre autem contradicentibus litigatoribus non potest.
Paulus libro 13 ad edictum
pr. Si duo rei sunt aut credendi aut debendi et unus compromiserit isque vetitus sit petere aut ne ab eo petatur: videndum est, an si alius petat vel ab alio petatur, poena committatur: idem in duobus argentariis quorum nomina simul eunt. Et fortasse poterimus ita fideiussoribus coniungere, si socii sunt: alias nec a te petitur, nec ego peto, nec meo nomine petitur, licet a te petatur.
1. Semel commissa poena solvi compromissum rectius puto dici nec amplius posse committi, nisi id actum sit ut in singulas causas totiens committatur.
Gaius libro quinto ad edictum provinciale
Si pupillus sine tutoris auctoritate compromiserit, non est arbiter cogendus pronuntiare, quia si contra eum pronuntietur, poena non tenetur: praeterquam si fideiussorem dederit, a quo poena peti possit. Idque et Iulianus sentit.
Ulpianus libro 77 ad edictum
Si feriatis diebus cogente praetore arbiter dicat sententiam et petatur ex compromisso poena, exceptionem locum non habere constat, nisi alia lege eadem dies feriata, in qua sententia dicta est, excepta.
Celsus libro secundo digestorum
Quamvis arbiter alterum ab altero petere vetuit, si tamen heres petit, poenam committet: non enim differendarum litium causa, sed tollendarum ad arbitros itur.
Modestinus libro sexto regularum
Cum poena ex compromisso petitur, is qui commisit damnandus est, nec interest, an adversarii eius interfuit arbitri sententia stari nec ne.
Iavolenus libro 11 ex Cassio
pr. Non ex omnibus causis, ex quibus arbitri paritum sententiae non est, poena ex compromisso committitur, sed ex his dumtaxat, quae ad solutionem pecuniae aut operam praebendam pertinent. Idem contumaciam litigatoris arbiter punire poterit pecuniam eum adversario dare iubendo: quo in numero haberi non oportet, si testium nomina ex sententia arbitri exhibita non sunt.
1. Cum arbiter diem compromissi proferri iussit, cum hoc ei permissum est, alterius mora alteri ad poenam committendam prodest.
Pomponius libro 11 ex variis lectionibus
Arbiter calendis ianuariis adesse iussit et ante eum diem decessit: alter ex litigatoribus non adfuit. Procul dubio poena minime commissa est: nam et Cassium audisse se dicentem aristo ait in eo arbitro, qui ipse non venisset, non esse commissam: quemadmodum servius ait, si per stipulatorem stet, quo minus accipiat, non committi poenam.
Callistratus libro primo edicti monitorii
Cum lege Iulia cautum sit, ne minor viginti annis iudicare cogatur, nemini licere minorem viginti annis compromissarium iudicem eligere: ideoque poena ex sententia eius nullo modo committitur. Maiori tamen viginti annis, si minor viginti quinque annis sit, ex hac causa succurrendum, si temere auditorium receperit, multi dixerunt.
Papinianus libro secundo responsorum
Arbiter intra certum diem servos restitui iussit, quibus non restitutis poenae causa fisco secundum formam compromissi condemnavit: ob eam sententiam fisco nihil adquiritur, sed nihilo minus stipulationis poena committitur, quod ab arbitro statuto non sit obtemperatum.
Scaevola libro primo responsorum
De rebus controversiisque omnibus compromissum in arbitrum a Lucio Titio et Maevio Sempronio factum est, sed errore quaedam species in petitionem a Lucio Titio deductae non sunt nec arbiter de his quicquam pronuntiavit: quaesitum est an species omissae peti possint. Respondit peti posse nec poenam ex compromisso committi. Quod si maligne hoc fecit, petere quidem potest, sed poenae subiugabitur.
Scaevola libro secundo digestorum
Inter Castellianum et Seium controversia de finibus orta est et arbiter electus est, ut arbitratu eius res terminetur: ipse sententiam dixit praesentibus partibus et terminos posuit: quaesitum est, an si ex parte Castelliani arbitro paritum non esset, poena ex compromisso commissa est. Respondi, si arbitro paritum non esset in eo, quod utroque praesente arbitratus esset, poenam commissam.
Ulpianus libro 28 ad Sabinum
In compromissis arbitrium personae insertum personam non egreditur.
Paulus libro 12 ad Sabinum
De his rebus et rationibus et controversiis iudicare arbiter potest, quae ab initio fuissent inter eos qui compromiserunt, non quae postea supervenerunt.
Iulianus libro quarto digestorum
pr. Si compromissum ita factum est, ut praesente utroque aut heredibus eorum arbiter sententiam dicat et alter ex litigatoribus decesserit pupillo herede relicto, non aliter videtur sententia dicta esse, nisi tutoris auctoritas interposita fuerit.
1. Item si alter ex compromittentibus furere coeperit,
Modestinus libro quarto regularum
Arbiter ad ferendam sententiam non compelletur:
Iulianus libro quarto digestorum
pr. Sed et interpellatur, quo minus sententiam dicat, quia nihil coram furioso fieri intellegitur. Quod si furiosus curatorem habet vel habuerit adhuc litigio pendente, potest praesente curatore sententia dici.
1. Arbiter adesse litigatores vel per nuntium vel epistulam iubere potest.
2. Si ab altera dumtaxat parte heredis mentio comprehensa fuerit, compromissum solvetur morte cuiusque ex litigatoribus, sicut solveretur altero mortuo, si neutrius heredis persona comprehenderetur.
Alfenus libro septimo digestorum
Arbiter ex compromisso sumptus cum ante eum diem, qui constitutus compromisso erat, sententiam dicere non posset, diem compromissi proferri iusserat: alter ex litigatoribus dicto audiens non fuerat: consulebatur possetne ab eo pecunia ex compromisso peti. Respondi non posse, ideo quod non esset arbitro permissum ut id iuberet.
Marcianus libro secundo regularum
Si de re sua quis arbiter factus sit, sententiam dicere non potest, quia se facere iubeat aut petere prohibeat: neque autem imperare sibi neque se prohibere quisquam potest.
Marcianus libro quarto regularum
Si qui iussus est ab arbitro ex compromisso solvere pecuniam moram fecerit, poenam ex compromisso debet, sed postea solvendo poena liberatur.
Corpus iuris civilis, Cod. 2, 55 (Source: http://webu2.upmf-grenoble.fr/DroitRomain/Corpus/CJ2.htm#55 )
Imperator Antoninus . Ex sententia arbitri ex compromisso iure perfecto aditi appellari non posse saepe rescriptum est, quia nec iudicati actio inde praestari potest et ob hoc invicem poena promittitur, ut metu eius a placitis non recedatur. Sed si ultra diem compromisso comprehensum iudicatum est, sententia nulla est, nec ullam poenam committit qui ei non paruerit. * ANT. A. NEPOTIANAE. *
Imperatores Carus, Carinus, Numerianus . Si contra compromissum adversarius tuus apud electum arbitrum praesentiam sui facere detrectavit, placitae poenae videtur obnoxius. * CARUS CARINUS ET NUMER. AAA. CLEMENTI. *
Imperatores Diocletianus, Maximianus . Arbitrorum ex compromisso sententiae non obtemperans, si sordes vel evidens gratia eorum qui arbitrati sunt intercessit, adversus filiam tuam agentem ex stipulatu exceptione doli mali uti poteris. Sed et ex doli clausula, quae compromissi stipulationi subici solet, filiam tuam convenire non vetaberis. * DIOCL. ET MAXIM. AA. ET CC. PETRONIAE. *
Imperator Justinianus . Ne in arbitris cum sacramenti religione eligendis periurium committatur et detur licentia perfidis hominibus passim definitiones iudicum eludere, sanctissimo arbitrio et huiusmodi rem censemus esse componendam.
1. Si igitur inter actorem et reum nec non et ipsum iudicem fuerit consensum, ut cum sacramenti religione lis procedat, et ipsi quidem litigatores scriptis hoc suis manibus vel per publicas personas scripserint vel apud ipsum arbitrum in actis propria voce deposuerint, quod sacramentis praestitis arbiter electus est, hoc etiam addito, quod et ipse arbiter iuramentum praestitit super lite cum omni veritate dirimenda, eius definitionem validam omnimodo custodiri et neque reum neque actorem posse discedere, sed tenere omnifariam, quatenus oboedire ei compellantur.
2. Sin autem de arbitro quidem nihil tale fuerit vel compositum vel scriptum, ipsae autem partes litteris hoc manifestaverint, quod iuramenti nexibus se illigaverint, ut arbitri sententia stetur, et in praesenti casu omnimodo definitionem arbitri immutatam servari, litteris videlicet eorum similem vim obtinentibus, sive ab initio hoc fuerit ab his scriptum vel praefato modo depositum, dum arbiter eligebatur, sive post definitivam sententiam hoc scriptum inveniatur, quod cum sacramenti religione eius audientiam amplexi sunt vel quod ea quae statuta sunt adimplere iuraverunt.
3. Sed et si ipse solus arbiter hoc litigatoribus poscentibus et vel scriptis vel depositionibus, ut dictum est, manifestum facientibus praestiterit iuramentum, quod cum omni veritate liti libramenta imponat, similem esse etiam in praesenti casu prioribus eius definitionem et eam omnimodo legibus esse vallatam.
4. Et in his omnibus casibus liceat vel in factum vel condictionem ex lege vel in rem utilem instituere, secundum quod facti qualitas postulaverit.
5. Sin autem in scriptura quidem aut depositione nihil tale appareat, una autem pars edicat iuramentum esse praestitum, quatenus arbitrali stetur sententia, huiusmodi litigatorum vel solius arbitri sermones minime esse credendos, cum et, si quis iusiurandum datum esse non iudice supposito nec hoc scriptura partium testante concesserit, incerti certaminis compositio, quae inter homines imperitos saepe accidit, non aliquid robur iudicatis inferat, sed in huiusmodi casu haec obtineant, quae veteres super arbitris eligendis sanxerunt.
6. Si quis autem post arbitri definitionem subscripserit á¼μμÎνειν vel στοιχεá¿ν vel πληροῦν vel πάνταποιεá¿ν vel διδÏναι (Graecis enim vocabulis haec enarrare propter consuetudinem utilis visum est), etsi non adiecerit á½μολογῶ, et sic omnimodo per actionem in factum eum compelli ea facere quibus consensit. Qualis enim differentia est, si huiusmodi verbis etiam á½μολογῶ adiciatur vel huiusmodi vocabulum transmittatur.
7. Si enim verba consueta stipulationum et subtilis, immo magis supervacua observatio ab aula concessa est, nos, qui nuper legibus a nobis scriptis multa vitia stipulationum multasque ambages scrupulososque circuitus correximus, cur non et in huiusmodi scriptura totam formidinem veteris iuris amputamus, ut, si quis haec scripserit vel unum ex his, adquiescere eis compellatur et ea ad effectum omnimodo perducere? cum non est verisimile haec propter hoc scripsisse, ut tantum non contradicat, sed ut etiam ea impleat, adversus quae obviam ire non potest. * IUST. A. DEMOSTHENI PP. *
Imperator Justinianus . Cum antea sancitum fuerat in arbitris eligendis, quos neque poena compromissi vallabat neque iudex dederat, sed nulla praecedente sententia communis electio, ut in illorum sententia stetur, procreabat, si quidem pro parte pulsata forma arbitralis procederet, exceptionem ei veluti pacti generari, sin autem pro actore calculus poneretur, nihil ex eo procedere ei praesidii: sancimus in eos arbitros, quos praediximus et quos talis consensus elegerit sub eo pacto in scriptis vel non in scriptis habito, ut eorum definitioni stetur, si quidem subscripserint, postquam definitio procedit, quod non displicet ambabus partibus eorum sententia, non solum reo exceptionem veluti pacti generari, sed etiam actori ex nostro numine in factum actionem, quatenus possit sententia eius exsecutioni mandari, sed in hac quidem regia civitate ab officio eminentissimae praefecturae vel eius, cuius forum pars sequitur fugientis, in provinciis autem tam per moderato res quam apparitiones eorum, vel per iudices , quorum regimen pars pertimescat pulsata.
1. Sin autem minime quidem post sententiam subscripserint arbitri formam amplecti, sed silentio eam roboraverint et non intra decem dies proximos attestatio missa fuerit vel iudici vel adversariis ab alterutra parte, per quam manifestum fiat definitionem non esse amplectendam, tunc silentio partium sententiam roboratam esse et fugienti exceptionem et agenti memoratam actionem competere.
2. Altera autem parte recusante secundum praefatum modum et implere statuta minime cupiente nihil fieri praeiudicium neque pari vel exceptionem reo vel actori actionem, exceptis videlicet arbitris, qui cum sacramenti religione electi sunt secundum novellam nostri numinis constitutionem: tunc etenim ea omnia servari, quae lege nostra super huiusmodi audientia definita sunt.
3. Licet non ignoramus Iulii Pauli opinionem et aliorum prudentium certorum, qui tetigerunt quidem huiusmodi quaestionem, quam in praesenti adgredimur, non autem perfectissime peregerunt, sed usque ad quasdam temporales actiones standum esse existimaverunt, plenius tamen et generaliter definimus conventum in scriptis apud compromissum iudicem factum ita temporis interruptionem inducere, quasi in ordinario iudicio lis fuisset inchoata.
4. Ad haec generaliter sancimus in his, quae apud compromissarios acta sunt, si aliquod in factum respiciens vel professum est vel attestatum, posse eo et in ordinariis uti iudiciis. * IUST. A. IULIANO PP. *
Imperator Justinianus. Sancimus mulieres suae pudicitiae memores et operum, quae eis natura permisit et a quibus eas iussit abstinere, licet summae atque optimae opinionis constitutae arbitrium in se susceperint vel, si fuerint patronae, inter libertos suam interposuerint audientiam, ab omni iudiciali agmine separari, ut ex earum electione nulla poena, nulla pacti exceptio adversus iustos eorum conventores habeatur. * IUST. A. IOHANNI PP. *
Corpus iuris civilis: Dig. 4, 8
Source: http://www.constitution.org/sps/sps.htm
Translation by : S. P. Scott, The Civil Law, Including The Twelve Tables, The Institutes of Gaius, The Rules of Ulpian, The Opinions of Paulus, The Enactments of Justinian, and The Constitutions of Leo, 1932, Vol. III, p. 116 et seq.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book II.
Arbitration is conducted in the same manner as a trial in court, and is intended to put an end to litigation.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book IV.
It is established that an exception cannot arise from arbitration, but an action for a penalty imposed can.
The Same, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Labeo says that where an award is given under an arbitration, by which a party is released from an action on guardianship by a minor under twenty-five years of age, it should not be confirmed by the prætor; nor will an action for the recovery of the penalty on account of it be granted.
1. Although the prætor does not compel anyone to undertake an arbitration (since this is voluntary and depends upon the exercise of the will, and is outside his jurisdiction), nevertheless, where a party has once assumed the duties of the office, the prætor thinks that the matter requires his care and attention; not so much because it is his object that legal controversies should be terminated, but in order that persons should not be disappointed who have selected someone to decide between them who was considered to be a reliable man. For, suppose that after the case had been examined one or more times, and the private concerns of both parties had been made public, and the secrets of the business had been disclosed, the arbiter should refuse to give an award; either for the purpose of showing partiality, or because he had been corrupted by bribery, or for some other reason; could anyone deny that it was not perfectly right that the prætor should intervene in order to compel the arbiter to discharge the duties of the office which he had assumed?
2.The prætor says: "A party who undertakes arbitration by which submission is made to his award under a pecuniary penalty."
3. Let us first consider the personality of the arbiters. The prætor can compel an arbiter, no matter what his rank may be, to perform the duties of the office which he has undertaken, even though he be of consular rank, unless he holds some magisterial position, or is invested with other authority; as, for instance, that of consul, or prætor, since he then has no jurisdiction;
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
For magistrates cannot be subject to coercion where they possess higher or equal authority; nor does it make any difference whether they accepted the office of arbiter during the term of their magistracy, or previously. Inferior officials, however, can be subjected to compulsion.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
The son of a family can also be compelled to act.
Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V.
Moreover, the son of a family can also be appointed arbiter in a matter in which his father is interested; and it is held by many that he can also be a judge.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Pedius says in the Ninth Book, and Pomponius in the Thirty-third Book, that it is of little importance whether a party who was appointed arbiter is free born, or a freedman of good reputation, or has been branded with infamy. Labeo says that a slave cannot act as arbiter, and this opinion is correct.
1. Therefore Julianus states that where a question for arbitration is referred to Titius and a slave, Titius cannot be forced to give an award, because he undertook the arbitration with another; although he states that there is no arbitration by a slave. What then would be the result if Titius should give an award? In this instance the penalty would not be payable, because he did not render the award in compliance with the conditions under which he assumed the office.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
But where the terms of the arbitration were, "that the award of either party alone should be valid", then force can be brought to bear against Titius.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
But where a slave had been appointed arbiter and makes an award after he has become free, I am of the opinion that if he does this after obtaining his freedom, and the parties consent, that his act will be valid.
1. Neither a ward, nor an insane person, nor one who is deaf or dumb, can be appointed an arbiter; as Pomponius asserts in the Thirty-third Book.
2. Where a party is a judge, he is forbidden by the Lex Julia to act as arbiter in the same matter in which he is to decide as judge, or to appoint himself; and if he makes an award, a suit for the penalty shall not be granted.
3. There are others who cannot be compelled to give an award; for instance, where the corruption or the turpitude of the arbiter is evident.
4. Julianus says that if the litigants defame the arbiter, the prætor should by no means dismiss him, but only where proper cause is shown. The same jurist says that if the parties treat the authority of the arbiter with contempt, and apply to the court,
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Or to some other arbiter;
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
And afterwards the litigants return to the original arbiter, the prætor should not compel him to decide between those who have treated him insultingly, and rejected him in order to have recourse to another.
1. An arbiter cannot be compelled to give an award, unless arbitration was agreed upon.
2.Where the prætor says: "Under a pecuniary penalty"; we must understand that a sum of money is not payable on both sides, but that there may be other property promised by way of a penalty, where one of the parties does not abide by the award; and this was the opinion of Pomponius. What, then, if property was deposited with the arbiter under the condition that he should deliver it to the party who gained the case, or should deliver it if one of the parties did not comply with the award; will he be compelled to make an award? I think he will be. The case would be the same where a certain amount is left in his hands for this purpose. Hence, if one party has promised in the stipulation to deliver property, and the other to pay money, the submission to arbitration is complete, and the arbiter can be forced to make an award.
3. Sometimes, as Pomponius remarks, submission to arbitration may properly be made by a mere agreement; as, for instance, where both parties are debtors, and agree that if either of them does not comply with the award of the arbiter, he shall not have the right to collect what is owing to him.
4. Moreover, Julianus states that an arbiter cannot be forced to give an award, where one party makes a promise and the other does not.
5. He is of the same opinion where the penalty was agreed upon subject to a condition; as, for instance: "If a certain ship should return from Asia so many thousand", for the arbiter cannot be compelled to make an award until the condition has been fulfilled, lest it may be void on account of the failure of the condition; and Pomponius also says the same thing in the Thirty-third Book on the Edict.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
In this case, perhaps, the only reason for applying to the prætor will be where the time appointed for the hearing can be prolonged, for then it may be done.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Pomponius says that if either party is released from the penalty agreed upon, the arbiter should not be forced to give an award.
1. He also states that if my demands alone are submitted to arbitration, and I have stipulated for a penalty to be paid by you; it must be considered whether or not this is a reference to arbitration. I do not see, however, wherein he finds any difficulty; for, if the understanding of the parties only relates to the claims of one of them, there is no reason in his statement, as it is lawful for one thing to be arbitrated; but if he means that the stipulation is only made on one side, what he says is reasonable. If, however, the party who made the stipulation is the one bringing the action, the submission to arbitration may be said to be more complete, for the reason that the party who is sued is protected; as, for instance, by an exception based upon contract, and if he does not comply with the award, he who brings the suit can have recourse to the stipulation. I do not think, however, that this opinion is correct; for it is not sufficient for the party to have an exception, as the arbiter may be compelled to make an award.
2. A person is held to have accepted the office of arbiter (as Pedius says in the Ninth Book), when he undertook the duties of a judge, and promised to settle the controversies of the parties by his award. But if, as he says, the arbiter should only proceed so far as to ascertain whether the parties will permit their controversy to be settled by his advice or authority, he is not held to have assumed the duties of arbiter.
3. An arbiter who has been appointed is not compelled to give an award upon those days on which a judge is not required to render a decision; unless the term fixed by the arbitration is about to expire, and cannot be prolonged.
4. Thus, if the arbiter is urged by the prætor to render his award, it will be perfectly just that he should have time granted him for the doing so, if he swears that the case is not yet sufficiently clear to him.
Pomponius, On Quintus Mucius, Book XI.
If the matter is submitted to arbitration without appointing a day for it to be heard, it is absolutely necessary for the arbiter to fix one, of course with the consent of the parties, and the case should then be decided; because if he should fail to do this, he can be compelled to make his award at any time.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Even though the prætor should unqualifiedly state in the Edict that he will compel the arbiter to make an award; nevertheless, he should sometimes pay attention to his reasons, and accept his excuses, where proper cause is shown; as, for instance, where he is defamed by the litigants; or where deadly hostility arises between him and them or one of them; or where age or sickness, with which he was afterwards attacked, releases him from the discharge of his duty; or if he is occupied with his own affairs, or there is urgent necessity for his making a journey; or some public office requires his attention; and this is the opinion of Labeo.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Or where the arbiter is subjected to any other inconvenience after he has accepted the office. But in case of illness or other occurrences of this kind, he may be compelled to defer consideration of the matter, where proper cause is shown.
1. An arbiter should be excused from acting where he is occupied in a case in his own behalf, whether it be either public or private; at all events, where the day of the hearing cannot be postponed; but if it can be, why should not the prætor compel him to defer it as he has the right to do so, since this can sometimes be accomplished without any inconvenience to the arbiter? Where, however, both parties wish him to render an award, even though no bond was given for postponement; still, he cannot do otherwise, if he has an action of his own pending, unless he consents that the case may be submitted to him anew. This, of course, is dependent upon the fact that the time is about to expire.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Moreover, where one of the litigants has made an assignment of his property, Julianus states in the Fourth Book of the Digest that the arbiter cannot be compelled to give an award, since the party referred to can neither sue nor be sued.
1. Where the litigants return to the arbiter a long time afterwards, Labeo states that he is not compelled to give an award.
2. Where there are several arbiters who have assumed the office, one of them alone cannot be compelled to make an award, but all must do so, or none.
3. For this reason Pomponius asks in the Thirty-third Book, if, where an arbitration was agreed upon in such a way that whatever Titius decided Seius was to award; which of the two would be subject to compulsion? I am of the opinion that an arbitration of this kind, in which the arbiter has not perfect liberty to render his decision is not valid.
4. But where the terms of the arbitration are that the question shall be decided by either Titius, or Seius; Pomponius says — and we agree with him — that the arbitration is valid; but the arbiter who must be compelled to make the award is the one whom the litigants agree upon.
5. Where the arbitration is referred to two persons, on the condition that if they disagree they may call upon a third; I think that a reference of this kind is not valid, for they may disagree as to the person applied to, but if the condition is that Sempronius shall be joined as the third party, the arbitration will be valid, since there can be no disagreement in calling upon him.
6. Let us consider a special case, namely: where a question is submitted to two arbiters, should the prætor compel them to give an award; for, on account of the natural tendency of men to disagree the question might be almost incapable of settlement. Where the number is odd, arbitration for that reason is sustained, not for the reason that it is easy for all of the parties to agree, but because, if they disagree, there is a majority upon whose decision reliance can be placed. It is usual, however, for the controversy to be submitted to two persons, and if they do not agree, the prætor should compel these arbiters to select some third person whose authority may be obeyed.
7. Celsus states in the Second Book of the Digest, that where the dispute is submitted to three arbiters, it is sufficient if two of them agree, provided the third is present; but if he is absent, even though the remaining two agree, the award will not be valid, because arbitration was submitted to more than two, and the third by his presence might have induced them to accept his own opinion:
Pomponius, Epistles and Various Passages, Book XVII.
Just as where three judges are appointed, and two of them render a decision by agreement, during the absence of the third, it is void; for the reason that a judgment is only valid where rendered by a majority, when it is evident that all have rendered some decision.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Labeo says that it does not concern the prætor what kind of an award the arbiter makes, provided he states what his opinion is. Therefore, if the matter was referred to the arbiter to render some certain decision, this would be no arbitration; nor could he be compelled to make an award; as Julianus states in the Fourth Book of the Digest.
1. We must consider that an arbiter renders a decision, when he does so with the intention that the entire matter in controversy shall be settled. But where arbitration with reference to several matters is involved, unless he disposed of all that are in controversy, he will not be held to have made an award, and he can still be forced by the prætor to act.
2. For this reason it should be considered whether an arbiter can change his decision; and the question has even been raised where an arbiter orders property to be delivered, and subsequently forbids this to be done, whether what he ordered, or what he forbade should stand. Sabinus thinks that he can change his decision. Cassius sustains the opinion of his master, and says that Sabinus did not have in his mind a decision which put an end to the arbitration, but only one made during the preparation of the case; for example, where he ordered the litigants to appear on the kalends, and afterwards on the ides; for he had a right to change the day. Thus, if he rendered a decision against the defendant, or in his favor, then, as he would cease to be arbiter, he could not change his decision;
Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V.
Because one arbiter cannot amend his decision even if he committed an error in rendering it.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
But, if an arbiter who has been appointed for the settlement of several controversies, which have no connection with one another, gives an award with reference to one of them, but not as to the others, what then? Has he ceased to be arbiter? Therefore, we must consider whether he has a right to change a decision which he has already rendered with reference to the first one. It makes a great deal of difference whether or not he was to decide all the matters submitted to him for arbitration at the same time, for if he was to decide with reference to all of them, he could change his decision, as he had not yet rendered it; but where he was to decide them separately, there were, so to speak, several things to be determined, and so far as that particular matter in controversy was concerned, he has ceased to be arbiter.
1. Where an arbiter gives the award that Titius does not appear to owe Seius anything, although he does not forbid Seius to bring an action; still, if the latter should do so, he would appear to oppose the award of the arbiter; and both Ofilius and Trebatius are in accord upon this point.
2. I think that an arbiter cannot appoint a special time for payment, and Trebatius also appears to be of this opinion.
3. Pomponius says that where an arbiter gives an ambiguous award, it is invalid; for instance: "You must pay him what you owe him"; or, "You must adhere to your division"; or, "You must accept as your share what you have paid to your creditors".
4. Moreover, where an arbiter forbids an action to be brought for a penalty, in accordance with the terms of the arbitration; I find it stated in the Thirty-third Book of Pomponius that this is void; and he is right, because the conditions of arbitration have no reference to the collection of the penalty.
5. Papinianus states in the Third Book of Questions, that if the time fixed for the arbitration has expired, the litigants may agree upon a new one, with the same arbiter, but if the latter refuses to act in the second arbitration, he cannot be forced to do so; provided he was not responsible for the delay in performing his duty; as, if he was to blame for the delay, it would be perfectly right that he should be compelled by the prætor to again act as arbiter. This question can only arise where no arrangement was made in the first arbitration to extend the time, but if such provision was made, and he himself extended it, he will continue to act as arbiter.
6. The term "complete arbitration" is used where settlement is made with reference to the matters in controversy, for it relates to all disputes; but where there happens to be a difference concerning only one thing, although a complete arbitration may have been agreed upon, still, the rights of action in other cases remain unimpaired; for the only matter involved in an arbitration is that which it was agreed upon should be determined. It is, however, the safer way where anyone wishes only some certain matter to be settled by arbitration, to expressly mention the same when it is submitted.
7. Where an arbiter orders some dishonorable act to be performed, the litigants are not obliged to obey.
8. Where the parties appear before the arbiter within the time which was designated, and he orders them to appear after the time has elapsed, no penalty can be exacted.
9. Where either of the parties does not appear, for the reason that he was prevented by illness, or by absence on public business, or by the duties of some magisterial office, or for any other good reason; Proculus and Atilicinus hold that the penalty can be collected; but where he was ready to appoint the same arbiter for a new arbitration, an action will not be permitted against him, or he can protect himself by an exception. This, however, is only true where the arbiter was willing to accept the second arbitration; for Julianus very properly stated in the Fourth Book of the Digest, that he could not be forced to do so if he was unwilling, and in any event, the party is released from the penalty.
10. Where, for instance, the arbiter orders the parties to appear before him in a province, when it was agreed that the reference should take place at Rome; the question arises can he be disobeyed with impunity? The opinion given by Julianus in the Fourth Book is the better one, namely, that the place contained in the agreement to submit the matter in dispute is the one intended; and therefore, that he may be disobeyed with impunity if he orders the parties to appear elsewhere. What course then should be pursued if it does not appear what place was agreed upon? The better opinion is that that place was intended where the agreement for arbitration was entered into. But what must be done if the arbiter orders them to appear in some place adjoining the City? Pegasus holds that the order would be valid; but I think that this is only true where the arbiter is a man of such authority that he can perform his duties in retired places, and the litigants can readily go to the place designated.
11. But if the arbiter should order the parties to go to some disreputable locality, as for instance, to a tavern, or a brothel, as Vivianus says, he can doubtless be disobeyed with impunity; and this opinion Celsus also approves in the Second Book of the Digest. With reference to this he very properly raises the question, if the place is of such a character that one of the litigants cannot honorably go there but the other can, and he who could go without forfeiting his self respect did not do so, and the other went in spite of his disgrace, can the penalty agreed upon at the time of the arbitration be collected because the act was not performed? He very justly thinks that it cannot be collected, for it would be absurd if the order should be valid with reference to one party, and void with respect to the other.
12. It should be considered within what time an action should be brought on the stipulation, provided the party does not comply with the award of the arbiter. Celsus states in the Second Book of the Digest that if no certain time was specified, a reasonable time is understood, and that, when this has elapsed, suit can forthwith be brought for the penalty; nevertheless, he says if the party complies with the award before issue is joined in the case, the action based on the stipulation cannot proceed:
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Unless the plaintiff had some interest in the immediate payment of the money.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XXIII.
Celsus says that if the arbiter orders payment to be made by the kalends of September, and this should not be done, even though it was tendered afterwards, still, the penalty of the arbitration having once become due the right of action is not extinguished, since it is true that the money was not paid before the kalends. Where, however, the party accepted payment when it was offered, he cannot bring suit for the penalty, but will be barred by an exception on the ground of fraud. The case is different where he was only ordered to make payment.
1. Celsus also states, if you order me to pay you and you are prevented from receiving the money by illness, or for some other good reason, that Proculus is of the opinion that the penalty cannot be exacted even if I do not pay you until after the kalends, although you may be ready to receive it. He also thinks, very justly, that there are two orders of the arbiter to be considered, one to pay a sum of money, and the other to pay it before the kalends; therefore, although the penalty cannot be exacted from you because you did not pay the money before the kalends, as you were not to blame, you will still be liable for the part which you did not pay.
2. He also says that the words "Comply with the award", means nothing else than for the party to do all in his power to obey the decision of the arbiter.
3. Celsus also says that if an arbiter orders me to pay you a sum of money on a certain day, and you refuse to receive it, the defence can be made that the penalty is not collectible by law:
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
But if he should afterwards be ready to receive it, I can not refuse to pay it with impunity, because I did not pay it before.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Labeo states that where it was provided in the submission for arbitration that the arbiter should give his award concerning all matters involved in the case on the same day, and should have authority to extend the time, and he did extend the time after certain matters were decided, while others were not; the extension will be valid, but his award may be disobeyed with impunity. Pomponius approves the opinion of Labeo, which also seems to me to be correct, because the arbiter did not perform his duty in making his award.
1. This clause also: "He may extend the time for arbitration", does not give the arbiter the right to do anything else than to extend the time, and, therefore, he cannot diminish or make any change in the terms of the original agreement; hence he is always obliged to dispose of the other matters also, and must give an award with respect to everything.
2. Where the bond of a surety has been furnished in the first agreement for arbitration, Labeo states it should also be offered in the second one. Pomponius, however, doubts whether the same, or other sureties who are solvent should be furnished; for he says what would be the result if the same ones should refuse to act as sureties? I think, however, that if they should refuse to act as sureties, then, others, as good as they, should be given:
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
So that it shall not be in the power of the sureties, who refuse to bind themselves again to cause the penalty to be executed. The same rule applies if they should die.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
The arbiter can extend the time whether he is present, or whether he does so by a messenger, or by a letter.
1. Where mention of the heir or of any other parties interested in the arbitration is not made, the arbitration is terminated by death. We do not accept the opinion of Labeo, who thought that if the arbiter orders a sum of money to be paid, and the party dies before paying it, the penalty could be exacted, even though the heir was ready to tender it.
2. The award of the arbiter which he makes with reference to the matter in dispute should be complied with, whether it is just or unjust; because the party who accepted the arbitration had only himself to blame, as was stated in a Rescript by the Divine Pius, as follows: "The party must submit to the award with equanimity, even though it may be by no means well founded."
3. Where there are several arbiters and they have given different awards, a party will not be obliged to abide by them, but if the majority agree their award must stand; otherwise the penalty can be exacted. Hence, we find the question raised by Julianus, where out of three arbiters one gives an award for fifteen aurei, another for ten, and another for five, whose decision is to stand? Julianus states that five must be paid, since all of them agreed upon that amount.
4. Where anyone of the litigants fails to appear, since he did all he could to prevent the matter from being settled, the penalty may be exacted. Thus, a decision rendered when all the litigants were not present will not be valid, unless it was expressly stated in the agreement to submit the matter to arbiters that, whether one or both of them were absent the decision could be rendered, but he who was in default incurs the penalty, because he was responsible for the arbitration not taking place.
5. He is held to make his award in the presence of the parties when he does so before those who are endowed with intelligence; but he is also not considered to have done this where he made it in the presence of a party who is insane, or demented. In like manner, a decision rendered in the presence of a ward, unless his guardian is present, is not legally made. Julianus makes the same statement with reference to all these matters in the Fourth Book of the Digest.
6. Again, where either party being present, prevents the arbiter from giving his award, the penalty can be collected.
7. Where no penalty was mentioned in the proceedings for arbitration, but the party simply promised to comply with the judgment, an action for damages may be brought against him.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
It makes no difference whether the sum agreed upon as penalty is certain or uncertain; as, for example, where it was for, "As much as the property was worth".
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Where suit is brought against a person whom the arbiter forbade to be sued, this is in violation of his award. What then should be done if suit was brought against his surety, could the penalty be collected? I think that it could, and Sabinus holds the same opinion; for suit is practically brought against the principal. But where the arrangement was made with a surety, to submit the matter to arbitration, and suit is brought against the principal, the penalty cannot be collected; unless it was to the interest of the surety that the action should not be brought.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
When anyone brings a matter into court which it had been agreed to submit to arbitration, some authorities say that the prætor cannot interpose to compel the arbiter to give an award, because now no penalty will be incurred, any more than if the arbitration had been dismissed. If, however, this opinion should be adopted, the result will be that where a party had agreed to arbitration, and changes his mind, he will be able to evade the reference of the case. Therefore, he can be sued for the penalty, and proceedings may be instituted in regular form before a judge.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
When anything is done in contravention of a stipulation, suit can be brought for this cause only where the act was committed without fraud on the part of the person who made the agreement; for an action can be brought under the stipulation only on the ground that no one can profit by his own deceit. But if there is added to the agreement for arbitration, "If something is done fraudulently in the matter"; he who was guilty of fraud can be sued on the stipulation; and, therefore, if anyone corrupts an arbiter either with money, or by improper solicitation, or bribes the advocate of the other party, or anyone of those to whom he has entrusted his own case, he can be sued on the clause relating to fraud, as well as where he, through artifice, gets the best of his adversary. And, by all means, if he acts deceitfully in any way during the suit, an action on the stipulation can be brought; therefore, if his adversary desires to bring an action on the ground of fraud, he should not do so, as he is entitled to one based on the stipulation.
Where, however, a clause of this kind is not included in the agreement for arbitration, then, an action on the ground of fraud or an exception will lie. This submission to arbitration is a complete one, because it mentions the clause relating to fraud.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
In matters submitted to arbitration we do not consider whether the stipulated penalty is greater or less than the property involved.
1. An arbiter is not compelled to make an award where the penalty has been incurred.
2. Where a woman makes an agreement for arbitration in behalf of a third party, the proceeding for the collection of money will not be Valid on account of her appearance for another.
3. The conclusion of the matter is: that the Prætor cannot interpose, either where there was no submission for arbitration in the beginning, or if there was, it is uncertain whether it is one for which a penalty may be exacted, or the penalty can no longer be recovered for the reason that the right of arbitration has been extinguished either by lapse of time, by death, by release, by a judicial decision, or by agreement.
4. Where the arbiter is invested with a sacerdotal office, let us consider whether he can be compelled to make an award; for indulgence should be granted not only to the dignity of persons, but also to the majesty of God, whose ministers should only devote themselves exclusively to sacred affairs. Where, however, he assumed the office subsequently he should, under these circumstances, by all means render a decision.
5. An arbiter should not be compelled to make an award after the matter in dispute has been compromised, or the slave who was the subject of the arbitration is dead; unless, in the last instance the parties still have some interest in the proceedings.
6. Julianus stated ambiguously that if, through mistake, recourse was had to arbitration with reference to an offence involving infamy, or some matter which was liable to criminal prosecution, as, for instance, adultery, assassination, and other crimes of this kind; the prætor should forbid an award to be made, and if it was made, should refuse to permit its execution.
7. Where submission of a question of arbitration involving freedom is made, the arbiter cannot be compelled by law to render a decision; because the favor due to freedom requires that matters relating to it should be decided by judges of the highest rank. The same rule applies where the question involves either freedom of birth, or enfranchisement, and where it is stated that freedom should be conferred on account of a trust. The same must be said with respect to an action having reference to a breach of public order.
8. Where one of the parties to a reference for arbitration is a slave, Octavenus says that the arbiter should not be compelled to render an award, and if he does so, that an exception cannot be granted for the penalty in an action De Peculio. But if the other party, being a freeman, makes an agreement with him, let us consider whether an exception should be granted against the freeman. The better opinion is that it should not be granted.
9. Moreover, if anyone agrees to an arbitration at Rome, and, having departed, returns there as the member of an embassy, the arbiter is not compelled to give an award, any more than the party would be obliged to prosecute the case if he had previously joined issue; nor does it matter whether he was attached to an embassy in the first place, or not. But if he now submits the question to arbitration, I think that the arbiter can be compelled to make an award, because if the party voluntarily had joined issue in a suit at law he could be forced to proceed. Some authorities, however, are undecided with respect to this, but not properly so; as, at all events, they would entertain no doubts if the matter which the party consented to submit to arbitration while on an embassy was a contract which he entered into while under such employment; for the reason that he could be compelled in a matter of this kind to proceed with the trial. The question in the first instance is worthy of consideration, namely: whether if before the envoy agreed to arbitration, the arbiter could be compelled to render a decision if the envoy himself applied for it. And this, according to the first rule laid down, might seem to be unjust, because it was placed under the control of the party himself. This will come under the same rule, however, as if he wished to bring an action at law, which he had a right to do. An arbitration of this kind should be compared to an ordinary suit at law; so where the party is desirous for the arbiter to make an award, he will not be heard unless he sets up a defence.
10. Where a person who had agreed to arbitration with some one who is dead, contests the succession to the estate, if the arbiter makes an award, the estate will be prejudiced; and therefore, in the meantime, the arbiter is prohibited from doing so.
11. The time fixed for the arbitration may be extended, not by agreement of the parties, but by order of the arbiter, when it is necessary to extend it that liability for the penalty may not be incurred.
12. If an arbiter attempts to conceal himself, the prætor should cause him to be searched for, and if he does not appear for a long time, a fine should be imposed upon him.
13. Where an agreement was made to submit a question to several arbiters, on condition that if any one of them should make an award the parties must abide by it; notwithstanding the other arbiters may be absent, a single arbiter who is present may be compelled to make the award. But where arbitration is agreed upon under the condition that all shall make the award, or that it must be sanctioned by a majority; each one cannot be compelled to render a decision separately, because in a case of this kind the decision of one arbiter will not give rise to liability for the penalty.
14. Where an arbiter is evidently an enemy to one of the parties for other reasons, and was called upon before witnesses not to give an award and he, nevertheless, insisted on doing so, although no one compelled him; the Emperor Antoninus, to whom application was made, replied to the complaint of the party that he was entitled to an exception on the ground of malicious fraud. The same Emperor, when his advice was asked by a judge before whom a party had brought suit for a penalty, answered that, although an appeal could not be taken, the suit for the penalty would be barred by an exception on the ground of malicious fraud; therefore, an exception of this kind is a species of appeal, as it affords an opportunity for a rehearing of the award of the arbiter.
15. In treating of the duties of an arbiter it must be remembered that the entire subject depends upon the terms of the agreement for arbitration, since the arbiter can lawfully perform no other act except what was provided that he should perform; and, therefore, he cannot decide anything he pleases, nor with reference to any matter that he pleases, but only what was set forth in the agreement for arbitration, and in compliance with the terms of the same.
16. Inquiry has been made as to making the award, and it has been stated that any kind of an award will not be valid; although with respect to certain matters a difference of opinion exists. I think, in fact, that the penalty cannot be exacted if the arbiter states that the party in a question of this kind should begin a new reference before a judge, or himself, or some other arbiter. Julianus holds that he may be disobeyed with impunity, if he orders the parties to appear before another arbiter; for if they do so, there will be no end to the case; but if he decided as follows, namely: that land should be delivered, or security furnished, with the approval of Publius Mævius, the award should be obeyed. Pedius, also, adopts this opinion to avoid the continuance of arbitration, and to prevent it from being sometimes transferred to other arbiters who are hostile to the parties; and it is necessary, for the arbiter to render his award in such a way as to put an end to the controversy, for it will not be terminated when arbitration is either postponed or transferred to another arbiter. He also says that the award is partly dependent upon the kind of security furnished, and the character of the sureties; and that this cannot be delegated, unless it was agreed that the arbiter should determine by whose arbitration security should be furnished.
17. Moreover, if the arbiter orders someone to be associated with him, and this was not included in the agreement for arbitration, it is not held to be an award; for the award ought to have reference to the matter stated in the agreement, but no arrangement of this kind was made.
18. Where two principals have stipulated with one another, and wish their agents to conduct the proceedings before the arbiter, he can order the principals also to be present.
19. Where mention is made of an heir in the agreement for arbitration, the arbiter can order the heir also to be present.
20. It is included in the duty of an arbiter to determine in what way free possession shall be delivered. Can he also order a bond to be furnished that the principal will ratify the acts of his agent? Sextus Pedius thinks that this is not reasonable, for, if the principal does not ratify the act, he can be sued on the stipulation.
21. An arbiter can do nothing beyond what is stated in the agreement for arbitration; and, therefore, it is necessary to add that he shall have the right to extend the time fixed by the agreement; otherwise, his order may be disobeyed with impunity.
Papinianus, Questions, Book I.
An arbiter who is selected by an agreement for arbitration with the understanding that he may extend the time, can do so; but if the parties object he cannot defer the proceedings.
Paulus, On the Edict, Book XIII.
Where there are two joint debtors, or creditors, and one of them submits a question to arbitration, and the award forbids him to sue, or not to be sued, it should be considered whether a penalty will be incurred if one party sues, or is sued, by the other. The same question arises where there are two bankers who are joint creditors, and perhaps we might place them on the footing of sureties, if they are partners; otherwise, no action can be maintained against you, nor can I bring suit, nor can suit be brought in my name, even if it is brought against you.
1. I am of the opinion that the arbitration is entirely at an end where the penalty has once been incurred; nor can it be again incurred unless the parties expressly agreed that liability for it should be incurred as many times as occasion arose.
Gaius, On the Provincial Edict, Book V.
Where a ward makes an agreement for arbitration without the consent of his guardian, the arbiter is not compelled to render a decision, because, if it is rendered, the ward will not be liable for the penalty, unless he has furnished a surety from whom the penalty can be collected by an action; and this was also the opinion of Julianus.
Ulpianus, On the Edict, Book LXXVII.
When an arbiter makes an award under compulsion by the prætor, upon a holiday, and suit is brought for the penalty on account of the arbitration; it is established that an exception is not available, unless by some law the holiday upon which the award was pronounced is excepted.
Celsus, Digest, Book II.
Although the arbiter may have forbidden one of the parties to bring suit against the other, and, notwithstanding this, an heir brings an action, he will be liable for the penalty; for recourse is had to arbiters, not for the purpose of postponing litigation, but to absolutely terminate it.
Modestinus, Rules, Book VI.
When suit is brought for the penalty arising out of an arbitration, he shall be required to pay it who incurred the liability for the same; nor does it make any difference whether or not it was to the interest of the other party for the award of the arbiter to be observed.
Javolenus, On Cassius, Book XL
It is not in all cases where the decision of the arbiter is not obeyed that liability for the penalty arising from the arbitration is incurred, but only in those which have reference to the payment of money, or the performance of some service. Javolenus also states that an arbiter can punish the contumacy of a litigant by ordering him to pay a sum of money to his adversary; but a party must not be included among contumacious persons where he did not give the names of his witnesses in accordance with the decision of the arbiter.
1. If an arbiter orders the time fixed for arbitration to be extended, where he is allowed to do this, the default of either party will not allow the penalty to be collected by the other.
Pomponius, Various Extracts, Book XI.
An arbiter ordered the parties to appear on the Kalends of January, but died before that day, and one of the parties failed to be present. In this instance there is no question that the penalty was not incurred, for Aristo says that he heard Cassius state that where an arbiter did not himself appear, there was no ground for the payment of the penalty, and Servius also says that if the stipulator is to blame for not receiving the money, no penalty is incurred.
Callistratus, Monitory Edict, Book I.
As it is provided by the Lex Julia that a minor under twenty years of age cannot be compelled to act as judge; likewise, no one is permitted to select a minor under twenty years of age to serve as judge in an arbitration; and therefore a penalty is not incurred under any circumstances through an award made by him. Many authorities have stated that, where a party is over twenty years of age, and under twenty-five, and he rashly undertakes to hear a case of arbitration, in an instance of this kind relief should be granted.
Papinianus, Opinions, Book II.
An arbiter ordered certain slaves to be restored within a specified time, and, as they were not restored, he ordered the party to pay a penalty to the Treasury, in compliance with the terms of the agreement for arbitration. No right is acquired by the Treasury by reason of such an award, but there is, nevertheless, liability for the penalty under the stipulation, because the decision of the arbiter was not obeyed.
Scævola, Opinions, Book I.
Lucius Titius and Mævius Sempronius entered into an agreement to submit all their disputes to arbitration; but, through mistake, some matters were not included by Lucius Titius in his application, nor did the arbiter make any award with reference to them. The question arose whether those things which were omitted could be made the subject of a new application? The answer was that this could be done, and that no penalty was incurred in consequence of the arbitration; but if the party had committed the act maliciously, although indeed, he could makes a new application, he would be liable to the penalty.
The Same, Digest, Book II.
A controversy arose between Castelliannus and Seius with reference to boundaries, and an arbiter was chosen in order that the matter might be settled by his award; and he rendered his decision in the presence of the parties, and established the boundaries. The question arose whether, if the award was not complied with on the part of Castellianus, liability for the penalty growing out of the arbitration was incurred? I answered that the penalty was incurred where the arbiter was not obeyed in a matter which he decided in the presence of both parties.
Ulpianus, On Sabinus, Book XXVIII.
Where, in an agreement to arbitrate, it is stated that the award shall be made by a certain person, this cannot be extended to others.
Paulus, On Sabinus, Book XII.
An arbiter can make an award with reference to matters, accounts, and disputes, which in the beginning existed between the parties who submitted their affairs to arbitration, but not with reference to matters which took place subsequently.
Julianus, Digest, Book IV.
Where an agreement to arbitrate was in the following terms: "That the arbiter should make an award when both parties or their heirs were present"; and one of the litigants died, leaving a minor as his heir, it is held that the award will not be valid, unless the consent of the guardian is granted.
1. The same rule will apply where one of the parties becomes insane;
Modestinus, Rules, Book IV.
For, in this instance, an arbiter is not compelled to render a decision.
Julianus, Digest, Book IV.
And he may even be ordered not to render one, because nothing can be legally done in the presence of an insane person. Where, however, the lunatic has a curator, or one is appointed while the case is pending, the award can be made in the presence of the curator.
1. An arbiter can order the parties to appear either by a messenger, or by letter.
2. Where mention is made of an heir only with reference to one of the parties, the arbitration will be abrogated by the death of either of the litigants; as would have been the case if no mention of the heir of either had been made.
Alfenus, Digest, Book VII.
An arbiter was selected under an agreement for arbitration, and, not having been able to make his award within the period mentioned in the agreement, ordered the time of the hearing to be extended. One of the parties was not willing to obey the order; hence an opinion was asked as to whether an action could be brought against him for the penalty arising from the arbitration? I answered that this could not be done, for the reason that authority had not been granted to the arbiter to extend the time.
Marcianus, Rules, Book II.
Where anyone has been appointed an arbiter in a matter in which he himself is interested, he cannot make an award, because he would order himself to do something, or forbid himself to bring suit; for no one can command himself to perform an act, or prohibit himself from doing it.
The Same, Rules, Book IV.
Where a party is ordered by an arbiter to pay a sum of money in accordance with the terms of arbitration, and fails to do so, he must pay the penalty in pursuance of the agreement, but if he afterwards makes payment he will be released from the penalty.1
Corpus iuris civilis, Cod. 2, 55
Traslation by S.P. Scott, The Justinian Code from the Corpus Juris Civilis, 1932, http://www.freewebs.com/vitaphone1/history/justinianc.html
The Emperor Antoninus to Nepotiana.
It has frequently been stated in rescripts that an appeal cannot be taken from the decision of an arbiter appointed after a compromise which has been made in perfect compliance with law, because an action to enforce judgment cannot be granted under these circumstances; and for this reason the promise of a penalty is reciprocally made in order that, through fear of it, the parties may not refuse to abide by the decision.
Where, however, judgment is rendered after the expiration of the time mentioned in the compromise, it will be void, and the party who refuses to comply with it will not be liable to any penalty.
Given at Rome, on the ninth of the Kalends of August, during the Consulate of Antoninus, Consul for the fourth time, 223.
The Emperors Carus, Carinus, and Numerian to Clement.
If your adversary, in violation of the terms of the compromise, refuses to appear before the arbiter who has been chosen, he will be considered to have incurred the penalty agreed upon.
Given on the eighth of the Kalends of January, during the Consulate of Carus and Carinus, 283.
The Emperors Diocletian and Maximian, and the Cæsars, to Petronia.
If you do not comply with the award of the arbiters appointed under a compromise, when the avarice or favor of those who rendered it is apparent, you can avail yourself of the exception of malicious fraud against your daughter bringing an action on the stipulation; but you will not be prevented from proceeding against her under the clause providing against malicious fraud, which is usually added to stipulations connected with compromise.
Given on the third of the Ides of January, during the Consulate of the same Emperors, 293.
The Emperor Justinian to Demosthenes, Prætorian Prefect.
In order that perjury may not be committed in the case of arbiters, their selection should be confirmed by the solemnity of an oath, and that opportunity may not indiscriminately be afforded perfidious men to evade the decisions of judges, We order that questions of this kind shall be decided by the arbiter as follows:
1. Where the same judge has been selected by both plaintiff and defendant, who have agreed that the case shall proceed under the sanction of an oath, and the litigants themselves have consented to this either in writing or in the presence of public officials, or have stated it before the arbiter selected who reduced it to writing, and it shall also be added that the arbiter himself administered the oath for the purpose of disposing of the case in accordance with the truth, We order that the award shall, under all circumstances, remain unaltered, and that neither the defendant nor the plaintiff can disobey it, but that they shall be absolutely compelled to respect and comply with it.
2. If, however, nothing of this kind was either done or written by the arbiter, but the parties themselves produced a statement in their own handwriting, setting forth that they had bound themselves by oath to abide by the decision of the arbiter, in this instance, his award shall be maintained inviolate, for the reason that the statement of the parties themselves has the same force, whether it was made in the beginning, or drawn up in the above-mentioned manner at the time when the arbiter was chosen, or whether this written instrument was found after final judgment was rendered, either for the reason that the said parties confirmed the authority of the arbiter with the solemn formality of an oath, or because they swore to execute what had already been decided.
3. If it is evident by the instruments or the statements already mentioned that the arbiter himself alone took the oath, on the demand of the litigants, that he would decide the case in accordance with the truth, the award in the present instance, as in the former one, shall, in every respect, be valid according to law.
4. In all these cases, it shall be lawful for either an action in factum, a personal action for recovery under the law, or an equitable real action to be brought, according as circumstances may demand.
5. If, however, nothing of this kind should appear, either in writing or in the statements made, and only one party alleges that he has been sworn, no faith shall be given to the award of the arbiter alone or to the statements of one of the parties; for even if it should be admitted that an oath had been taken, but not in the presence of the court, and no written evidence of either of the parties was produced to show this, the conduct of an uncertain contest, which frequently takes place among ignorant men, does not in the least deprive the judgment of its force; but, in a case of this kind, all the rules should be observed which the ancient authorities laid down with reference to the selection of arbiters.
Extract from Novel 82, Chapter XI. Latin Text.
The new law provides that an arbiter shall not be appointed in such a way as to decide under the sanction of an oath, but that he must fix a penalty which, if paid, will permit a party to avoid the execution of the judgment. Where, however, anything is done contrary to this, and the judge who decides improperly does so through fraud, he may expect punishment from God; but if he errs through ignorance, the oath will not be binding, nor will the litigants be liable to punishment a second time.
THE TEXT OF THE CODE FOLLOWS.
6. He who has stated in writing at the end of the award of the arbiter that he approved of it, or that he would comply with it (by using certain Greek terms for this purpose, which by custom are considered preferable), although he may not have added "I promise," should be compelled by the action in factum to perform what he agreed to; for what difference is there when "I promise" is added to these words, or when the expression is absolutely omitted? For if We have corrected many defects in stipulations, as well as disposed of the innumerable circumlocutions and ambiguities with which they were overwhelmed, after having abolished the ordinary formulas and the subtle and superfluous statements which they contained, by means of laws recently enacted by Us, why should We not remove all the perplexities of the ancient law from instruments of this description, so that, where such an instrument is drawn up, one of the parties will be obliged to acquiesce in it, and be absolutely compelled to carry it into effect? For it is not probable that a document of this kind has been written only for the purpose of having it disputed; but rather in order that a decision, against which no opposition can be manifested, may be executed.
Given on the third of the Kalends of November, during the Consulate of Decius, 529.
The Same to Julian, Prætorian Prefect.
As has previously been decided in the choice of arbiters, where no penalty for the violation of a compromise was prescribed, and they were not appointed by a judge, and no common selection was made in compliance with the preceding decision, but this was done by common consent of the parties, the result will be that if the award was in favor of the defendant, an exception on the ground of contract will lie in his favor, but if it was in favor of the plaintiff, he will obtain no advantage from it; and We order with reference to those arbiters whom We have mentioned above, and who have been selected by common consent, under an agreement either written or verbal, that their award must be maintained; and if, after it has been rendered, the parties stated in writing that they were not displeased with it, not only an exception based on the agreement can be pleaded in behalf of the defendant, but also, by Our law, an action in factum, will lie in favor of the plaintiff, so that he can direct the award to be executed in this Imperial City by the Most Eminent Prefecture, or by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant, and in the provinces this can be done not only by the Governors, but by their subordinates, as well as by the judges having jurisdiction over the person who was sued.
If, however, after the decision was rendered, the parties interested did not sign the decree of the arbiter, but confirmed it by their silence, and within the next ten days no protest was sent to the judge or by either party to his adversary, by which it became evident that the award was not accepted, then it is confirmed by the silence of the parties, and an exception will lie in favor of the defendant, and the above-mentioned action in favor of the plaintiff. Where, however, one of the parties, after having complied with the formalities above mentioned, and not being willing to have the award executed rejects it, no prejudice to the rights of the parties will result, nor will the defendant have a right to an exception, nor the plaintiff to an action. Those arbiters, however, who have been chosen under the solemnity of an oath, are excepted under a new constitution which We have promulgated, for in this case all the provisions on this subject set forth in Our law must be complied with.
1. Although We are not ignorant of the opinion of Julius Paulus, and of certain other persons learned in the law, who have touched upon this question which we are at present discussing, they have not treated it in the most skilful manner, but have held that the decision should stand, so far as certain temporary actions are concerned. We, however, decide in a more complete and general way that an agreement entered into in writing in the presence of the arbiter appointed as the result of a compromise, interrupts the prescription, just as if the proceedings had been instituted before an ordinary judge.
2. With reference to this point, We order that, generally speaking, in controversies brought before arbiters, where a question of fact is involved, the statements of the litigants or the witnesses can also be made in the presence of ordinary judges.
Given on the sixth of the Kalends of ..., during the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530.
The Same to John, Prætorian Prefect.
We order that women shall be mindful of their modesty, and confine themselves to the performance of those functions for which Nature has designated them, and avoid those from which she has ordered them to abstain; and although where those of the highest reputation may have accepted the office of arbiter, or where, being patronesses, they have acted in this capacity for their freedmen, they shall be separated from all judicial duties, so that no penalty can be imposed for their selection, and no exception on the ground of an agreement can be pleaded against such persons as justly despise their decisions.
Given at Constantinople, on the Kalends of September, during the Consulate of Lampadius and Orestes, 530.
1 The arbiter, or judex, of the Roman Law, was the prototype of the modern master in chancery. He had only jurisdiction of matters of fact, and was appointed by the court with the consent of the parties, who had the right to reject him if they